Nebraska Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 4

Article 5

1956

The Journalist and His Confidential Source: Should
a Testimonial Privilege Be Allowed
W. D. Lorensen
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
W. D. Lorensen, The Journalist and His Confidential Source: Should a Testimonial Privilege Be Allowed, 35 Neb. L. Rev. 562 (1956)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol35/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Student Notes
THE JOURNALIST AND HIS CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE:
SHOULD A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE BE ALLOWED
INTRODUCTION
A few centuries have slipped by since the ancestor of the
modern-day journalist had his ears lopped off for publishing a
libel. 1 But the press still claims its martyrs at the hands of the
courts today-among them, the newsman faced with a choice of
violating his profession's code of ethics or standing in contempt
of court. This vexing situation arises when the newsman is
questioned by proper authority as to the source of information
which he has received in confidence. By the canons of the Fourth
Estate, the journalist dares not reveal who gave him his information.2 On the other hand, the law on the point is equally clear.
In the view of the reported cases, no testimonial privilege exists,
save in those twelve states where such a privilege is specifically
set out by statute.3 Cases in which the journalist's claim of privilege has been raised are not numerous, indicating perhaps that
the journalist is usually cooperative with authorities seeking information.4 However, when the claim does arise, neither the
judicial nor the existing statuary rules represent the best answer
in view of the policy questions involved.
THE BASIS FOR A PRIVILEGE
A testimonial privilege is a fly in the soup of the law of evidence. It is an exception to the general duty of every citizen to
testify. Long perished from judicial recognition is the nicety of
Thayer, Legal Control of the Press 9-10 (2d ed. 1950).
See Editor & Publisher 9 (Sept. 1, 1934). For an excellent discussion
of the newsman's privilege question, see Note. 36 Va. L. Rev. 61 (1950).
3 Clein v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950); People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). The states whfoh have enacted such statutes are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania. See note 10, infra.
4 References to the cooperative attitude of newsmen were not infrequent during a public hearing on a proposed privilege statute in New
York. See New York Law Revision Commission. Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 10446 (1949). At the time a privilege bill was before the New York Legislature, Governor Thomas E. Dewey issued the following statement:
·
The governor has had ten years experience as a prosecutor of
crime. In all his experience, he has never found it necessary or
desirable to attempt to compel any newspaperman to reveal the
source of his information. He has a deep understanding of problems of the men of the press and the need to protect their sources
of information.
Editor & Publisher 8 (l\Iarch 6, 1948).
1
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honoring a gentleman's word, or "point of honor." 0 Broader
community interests are at stake when the search for truth is
underway by proper authority. The commonly accepted personal
privileges which are recognized today, e.g., lawyer-client, doctorpatient, husband·wife, are justified on the grounds that the public
benefits more from protecting the confidentiality of these relationships than it is injured by the barriers such privileges raise in the
path of legal proceedings.6 Wigmore has reduced the policy considerations to four conditions, upon which he says the recognition
of a privilege must be predicated. These conditions are:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation.7
While it has been questioned whether currently recognized
privileges meet these conditions, these propositions serve as the
best available starting point for the consideration of whether a
privilege should be granted in any given situation.8
THE CURRENT LAW
The current rules which apply to a journalist's source privilege are too inflexible. The judicial view is that, absent statute,
there is no such privilege.9 The rule is broadly stated and apparently leaves no room for exception, no matter how greatly the
policy factors would weigh in favor of the journalist.

5 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 856 (1776).
Portions
of the opinions in this case are set out at 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2286 (3d
ed. 1940).
6 The statement in the text is essentially a paraphrase of Wigmore's
four conditions set out above. Wigmore does not specifically refer to
public benefits, but essentially that is the scale upon which points three
and four of Wigmore's tests are measured.
1 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2285.
s Compare R Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5. §§ 2291, 2332, 2380a, 2396
with Morgan, Forward, Model Code of Evidence 22-31 (1942).
9 See note 3 supra; Annot., 102 A.L.R. 771 (1936).
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The existing statutes, on the other hand, grant too broad a
privilege, with perhaps the exception of the Arkansas confidence
law. 10 Thus, if the journalist brings himself within the mechani10 The statutes allowing the privilege have been criticized as being "excessive in scope." 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supro note 5. The Arkansas
statute states that before a newsman can be "required" to disclose his
source of information "it must be shown that such article was written
.•. in bad faith, with malice and not in the interest of the public." For
a discussion of the scope of the various privilege statutes, see Note, 36
Va. L. Rev. 61, 62-67 (1950). The following table, using the words of
the statutes, illustrates the scope of the various privilege laws.

Who Is Protected
Personnel
Media

*See
**Date
Below
Adopted
-Alabani-a~~·'-P~e_r_s_o_n_s_e_n_g_a_g_e_d~i-n-,-i-~N~e-w_s_p_a_p_e-rs
__ ,__Y~e-s__ ,___
1~9~3=5~
State

Ala. Code
connected with, or
tit. 7, § 370 employed on any
(1940)
newspaper while engaged in news gathering capacity.
-Arizona.
Person engaged in
Newspapers
1937
Yes
newspaper or reAriz. Code
portorial work, or
Ann. § 23103 (Supp.
connected with, or
employed by any
1955)
newspaper.
1936
Arlmnsas
Editors, reporters,
Newspapers,
Yes
periodicals,
Ark Stat.
writers for news(1949)
Ann. § 42- papers or periodradio
917 (Supp.
cals, or owner of
19 5 5)
radio station.
-Calif_o_nu_·_a.__ ,__
P_u_b_li_s_h_e_rs_,_e_d-it_o_r_s-·'-N-ew-sp_a_p_e_rs
___ ,__Y_e_s__ ,___1_9_3_5_
Cal. Code
Civ. Proc.
Ann. § 1881
(6) (Deering 1946)
-IIldiana
Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 21733 (Burns
1955)

reporters and other
persons connected
with or employed
upon a newspaper
Bona fide owner,
editorial or reportorial employee of
(printed bedia) and
bona fide owner,
or reportorial employee of (radio
television) who rereceive principal
official, or editorial
income from legitimate writing, editing, interpretation,
announcing or

Weekly, semiweekly, triweekly and
daily newspapers conforming to
postal regulations and published for five
consecutive
in same city
and having
paid circulation of two

No

19-41
(1949)
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broadcasting of
news.

percent in
county in
which published; recoginized press
associations
and commerically licensed
radio and television stations.

___ ,__P_e_r_s_o_ns__e_n_g_a_g-ed~,-- 1 -Newspapers-,--t--Y-e_s__ ,__1_9_5~2--

~K--e-n_t_u-cky

Ky. Rev.
employed or conradio and
Stat. § 421.- nected with newstelevision.
100 (1953)
paper, radio or
television stations.
-1\1--a-ry-lan_d
___ ,_Persons engaged---!-N_e_w_s_p_a_p-er-s-,-·1--Y-es__ ,___
1_8_9_6_
l\Id. Code
of Gen.
Laws, art.
35, § 2
(1951)
---1\Iichigan
I\Iich. Stat.
Ann. c.
287, § 28.945 (1)
(1954)
-Montana
Mont, Rev.
Code Ann.
§ 93-601-2
(Supp.
1955)

-New Jersey
N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2:-

97-11
(1939)
Ohio
Ohio Rev.
Code §
2739.12
(1953)

in, connected with
or employed on a
(listed media).

Reporters

(1949)

Journals,
radio and
television

Newspapers
and "other
publications."

No

1949

Persons engaged
in work of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing disseminating, publishing, broadcasting or televising
news.
Persons engaged
in, connected with,
or employed on
any newspaper.

Newspapers,
press associations, radio
and television.

No

1943
(1951)

Newspapers

Yes

1933

Persons engaged in
the work on, or
connected with. or
employed by (listed
media) for purpose
of gathering, compiling, editing, disseminating or publishing news.

Newspapers
and press
associations.

No

1941
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cal confines of the statute, he can refuse to disclose his source
no matter how great a barrier he is raising in the path of important legal proceedings. The operation of the existing statutes
is conditioned upon such matters as whether the reporter seeking
to invoke it gets his primary income from reportorial endeavors,11
or whether the publication by which the reporter is employed enjoys a certain percentage of circulation in the county where it is
published.12 Such elements have, at best, only remote connection
with the essential policy questions involved.
WHEN IS THE PUBLIC BENEFITED?
If there is to be a journalist's source privilege, then there
must be a benefit accruing to the public from the existence and
protection of this relationship. The fact that the relationship is
a common one is evidenced by the almost daily appearance in the
press of news items quoting "informed sources," "usually reliable
sources,'' and other such undisclosed sources of information. That
the public is benefited by a free flow of news is a proposition
which needs no argument. In general, it would seem that if the
press must rely on undisclosed sources of information in certain
instances, and these sources provide information otherwise unattainable to the press, then the public benefits from the newsman's relation with his confidential source. But more specifically, where such a relationship brings about the disclosure of a
situation which requires litigation or investigation, and corrective

Pennsylvania
Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit.
28 § 330
(Supp.
1954)

Persons engaged
on, connected with,
or employed by
(listed media) for
the purpose of
gathering, procuring, compiling,
editing or publishing news.

Newspapers
of general
circulations
as defined by
Pennsylvania
law, and press
associations.

No

1937

*Some states require the information obtained from confidential sources
must be published or disseminated before the source can be kept secret.
This column of the table indicates where this is required by a "Yes" and
where it is not required by a "No."
**Dates shown in parenthesis show when the original statute was
amended to include radio and television, where applicable.

nind. Ann. Stat.§ 2-1733(Burns1955).
Ibid. The limitation of the privilege on the basis of circulation is
criticized in Note, 17 Ind. L.J. 162 (1941).
12
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action can progress without resort to the journalist's source, then
the public certainly benefits by the relationship. Such a fact
situation has arisen in a journalist contempt case before the House
of Representatives.
In one of the earliest journalist privilege cases to arise in
this nation, James W. Simonton, a Washington correspondent for
the New York Daily Times, (now the widely respected New York
Times) was cited for contempt of the House for refusing to disclose his confidential sources.13 Simonton was called to testify
after his paper had published charges that bribes were being doled
out to House members for votes on certain land grant measures.H
The publication set off an investigation by a select committee,
and Simonton was an early witness. The committee found the
substance of Simonton's reports to be essentially true, and these
conclusions were reached without resort to reporter's sources. The
corrective action that resulted was the recommended expulsion of
four members of the House.15 Simonton, nevertheless, was placed
in the custody of the Sergeant at Arms for the House for a time
for his contempt in refusing to divulge certain sources.16 It seems
that here, where the unsavory situation brought to light by the
journalist could be cleared up without resort to the reporter's
confidential sources, a privilege should have been recognized.
A similar case arose some four decades later, this time in the
Senate.17 Two newspapers claimed bribes, and other improper
influences, were being exerted to effect the passage of certain
tariffs favorable to the Sugar Trust. Again, the newspaper
charges prompted an investigation which found that the bribery
13 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 274-75, 411-12 (1857).
14 The article which touched off the investigation is set out at Cong.
Clobe, note 13 supra at 274. There was some objection to launching an
investigation on the basis of a newspaper article. Rep. A. K. Marshall of
Kentucky said.
I am extreme unwilling, Mr. Speaker, to base the action of
this House in reference to this matter upon any charges contained in any newspape of the day. . . . I have no idea of giving
to such contemptible things as appear in the newspapers of this
country the sort of respectability they would obtain by receiving
notice from this body.
Cong. Globe, note 13 supra at 275.
15H.R. Rep. No. 243, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 169-79 (1857).
16 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d sess. 411-12, 426 (1857).
17 The second case involved Elisha Edwards and John S. Shriver, correspondents for the Philadelphia Press, and the New York Mail and Express. See 26 Cong. Rec. 4796, 5451-52 (1894). This and other cases
dealing with the privileges of the Senate are collected in S. l\Iisc. Doc. No.
268, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894).
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charges were true. 18 The correspondents were questioned, and
again were punished for refusing to reveal their sources of information.19 Was the public in any way injured because the reporters caused an investigation which could be successfully concluded without disclosure of their sources?
In not every instance is a conclusive result reached in an investigation triggered by a journalist's charges. For example, the
charges of corruption and graft raised by a Chicago newsman in
1934 and investigated by a grand jury apparently were left hanging.20 A.L. Sloan, a reporter for the Chicago American, had written a series of stories for his paper charging graft in the Illinois
Relief Commission, and the Cook County Criminal Court instructed the grand jury to investigate the matter on the basis of
Sloan's articles. Sloan testified extensively, reportedly telling
where evidence of graft could be found in the books of the commission and offering the names of twenty-six persons who could
give further information. Sloan, however, refused to answer
questions propounded by the jury's counsel as to who had led him
to his information. For this he was brought before the court on
the jury counsel's motion to cite for contempt. The court refused
to cite Sloan on the grounds that any further testimony from him
would be irrelevant.21 While the identification of Sloan's confi1s S. Rep. No. 435, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894).
19 26 Cong. Rec. 5451-52 (1894).
The newsmen were this time certified to the federal district attorney for prosecution under the contumacy
statute adopted at the time of the earlier Simonton case. 11 Stat. 155
(1857). with minor revision, 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
The two reporters were not the only witnesses before the committee who
refused to testify. See Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, aff'd
sub nom. In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211 (1895).
20 A.L. Sloan (unreported) Editor & Publisher 10, (Aug. 11, 1934).
21 A portion of the court's opinion was reported as being:
A reading of Sloan's testimony before the grand jury discloses that he has "discovered" no material proof beyond that
already in the possession and knowledge of the state's attorney
of Cook County in certain cases.
If the court were satisfied that Sloan had facts which might
lead to the proof of graft, fraud, payroll padding or other criminal acts, the ends of justice could possibly be served a committment order, the effect of which might tend to bring these facts
to light, either from Sloan or from others with whom he may have
had contact. The record indicates, however, that the state's attorney, the grand jury and the court can be more profitabley employed than living in the hope or expectation of substantial proofs
from Sloan in his present state of declamatory zeal."
Editor & Publisher 10 (Aug. 11, 1934).
Irrelevancy has been a defence in other cases. In Rosenberg v.
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dential sources reasonably could be an irrelev~n_t matter, it is
difficult to see from the reported facts of this case that all further
testimony would be totally irrelevant, especially in the light of the
fact that the grand jury was instructed to investigate on the basis
of Sloan's newspaper articles. If Sloan could direct the grand
jury to evidence which would substantiate the charges without
divulging his confidential sources, then the administration of
justice would not be impaired by the recognition of a testimonial
privilege.
The benefit accruing to the public can be found in situations
other than those in which the active misconduct by public officials
is involved, as in the cases above. There have been a number of
situations in which the privilege question has arisen where the
published charges intimated a failure to enforce the laws. 22 The
obvious aim of the publication in such a case is to bring pressure
to bear on responsible officials to enforce the law. Such a situation gave rise to the leading case in the field, People ex rel. Mooney
v. Sheriff. 23
Carroll in re Lyons, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) Leonard Lyons, a
nationally syndicated columnist, wrote that Mrs. Ethel Rosenberg, under
a death sentence for espionage, could save herself by "talking" as the
court could alter her death penalty within 60 days. In a habeas corpus
proceeding seeking to have Mrs. Rosenberg transfered from the death cell
block at Sing Sing Prison, Lyons was asked the source of his information.
The court held that since Lyons' statement was merely a paraphrase of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, his source was irrelevant to the proceedings.
22 People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff. 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1436)
is the only reported case dealing with journalist contempt proceedings
growing out of news items which intimated a failure to enforce the law.
Other, unreported cases in which journalist contempt proceedings grew
out of similar situations include: Charles L. Leonard and Douglas Clark
(unreported) Editor & Publisher 7 (Mar. 6, 1948), discussed in the text
aboe, pp. 9-10; E.B. Chapman (unreported) N.Y. Times, April 20, 1940,
p. 8, col. 4; April 21, 1940, p. 12. col. 6, wherein Chapman, an editorial
writer for the Topeka State Journal, was fined $25 in police court for
refusing to divulge the sources of his story on vice conditions in Topeka;
Sherman Stambaugh (unreported) N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1939, p. 19, col.
4, wherein Stambaugh was cited for contempt for refusing to divulge
to a grand jury the identity of his sources for a story concerning gambling
in Toledo, Ohio; and Eddie Barr (unreported) N.Y. Times. March 13,
1931, p. 25, col. 8, wherein Barr was confined for refusing to divulge to
a grand jury the source of his story concerning the kidnapping and
beating of two men immediately after their release from jail in Dallas,
Texas. Barr purged himself after one day's confinement by indentifying
an assistant in the district attorney's office as his source.
23 279 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 {1936).

570

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

The case arose in New York City in 1934, when Martin
Mooney wrote a series of articles describing gambling operations
rampant in the city at that time. Mooney used ficticious names
and addresses to identify the persons and places in his articles.
He was called by a grand jury to testify and he did so. But he
refused to reveal the true names and locations that lay behind the
fictions in his articles. For this refusal, Mooney was cited to the
Court of General Sessions for contempt, where he was fined $250
and sentenced to thirty days in jail.24 Mooney's citation was reviewed by the New York Court of Appeals which found such
punishment to be valid, ruling squarely on the privilege issue. The
court apparently felt that no public benefit resulted from Mooney's
writings and settled the question on general considerations of
testim,onial privileges. The court said :
The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all information by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The
granting of a privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to the general rule. In the administration of justice, the
existence of the privilege from disclosure. as it now exists, often,
in particular cases, works a hardship. The tendency is not to extend the classes to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted,
but to restrict that privilege.25

It may be true that had Mooney disclosed his sources of information, the grand jury might have found sufficient evidence
to indict the gamblers of whom he had written. But it appears
that Mooney and his newspaper, the New York American, as well
as others, were more concerned about the general laxity of law
enforcement than with a single gambling operation.26 How much
the publication of Mooney's articles helped to generate the public
pressure which brought about the appointment of Thomas Dewey
as a special prosecuting attorney cannot be determined accurately.
However, in helping to bring such pressure to bear and thus encouraging better law enforcement, it should be recognized that
24 Judge Koenig's oral opinion in the trial court, somewhat sympathic
to newsman Mooney, is set out at New York Law Revision Commission,
Legis. Doc. 65(A), 19, 21 (1949). It may be that Mooney was as concerned with his personal safety as with "protecting" the identity of his
sources. A statement by the foreman of the grand jury to the court
indicated that Mooney, as well as other witnesses, had expressed fear of
recrimination for giving all the information they had. U.Y. Times, May
S, 1934, p. 40, col. 2.
2::; 269 N.Y. at 295, 199 N.E. at 416.
26 Within two weeks after Mooney appeared in the Court of General
Sessions, a citizen's committee petitioned the governor of New York for
the appointment of a special prosecutor to clean up the situation which
Mooney's articles reflected.
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the journalist actually is fostering the due administration of
justice. This element of public benefit should be considered when
the newsman seeks to keep his sources confidential: The burden
should be placed first upon the responsible law enforcement officials. Not until it is shown that such officials cannot obtain
needed information does the journalist's refusal to disel-Ose h1s
sources result in a serious public detriment. It is then that the
privilege claim becomes unjustified.
The state of New York experienced another similar case in
1948, this time involving alleged gambling operations in the city
of Newburgh. 27 The New York World Telegram set the stage for
this case when it published a story describing Newburgh in typical journalese as "The Barbary Banks of the Hudson." The
Orange County District Attorney's office replied that the allegations of vice conditions and gambling were "grossly exaggerated,"28
This statement was rebutted within a few days by the local paper,
the Newburgh News, when it published reproductions of numbers
tickets used for gambling in the community. Two members of the
Newburgh News staff were cited for contempt when they subsequently refused to divulge to a grand jury where they had procured the numbers tickets. (Their citation for contempt was
later vacated on grounds of a procedural defect.)29 The Newburgh incident gave rise to renewed efforts to enact a confidence
statute in New York and brought about an extensive study of the

21 Douglas Clarke and Charles L. Leonard (unreported) Editor & Publisher 7 (Mar. 6, 1948).
28 Ibid.
29 People ex rel. Clark v. Truesdell
79 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1948). The
court held that as the contempt was not committed in the trial court's
immediate view, the newsmen should have been given notice and reasonable opportunity to defend. The trial court had committed the newsmen
summarily. However, while the newsmen were jailed following the contempt citation, they wrote an article for Editor & Publisher, in which they
set out the following as their statement to the court at the time of their
citation:
The code of ethics of the newspaper profession, without any
statutory authority, stipulates without compromise, that violation
of a confidence is the gravest ethical omission of which a newspaperman can stand. We feel that we are bound to complay
with this principle and to make any sacrifice to perpetuate the
lofty ideals of the newspaper profession.
Editor & Publisher 7 (l\Iar. 6, 1948).
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problem by the New York Law Revision Commission.30 Whether
a privilege should have been granted in the Newburgh case again
should have depended upon whether diligent law enforcement officials could have uncovered the gambling operations.
Charges bearing on subjects other than criminal conduct and
corruption have come from the press and given rise to the privilege question. An example of this type is the most recent privilege case to arise before the national legislature.31 Albert Deutsch,
a reporter for the New York Newspaper PM, published a series
of articles criticizing the administration of veterans hospitals. He
was not the only critic on the subject.32 The administration of
veterans hospitals was being surveyed by the House Committee
on World War Veterans Legislation and Deutsch was caUed upon
to give testimony before the committee.33 Deutsch did give testimony, but he refused to disclose the identity of certain hospital
personnel who had given him information in confidence.34 The
committee first voted to cite Deutsch for contempt, but later
reversed its position-apparently because of public pressure generated in the press.35 If the committee's last resort was Deutsch's
30See New York Law Revission Commission, Leg. Doc. 65(A) (1949).
The bill introduced at the time of the Leonard-Clarke incident in 1948
was commonly known as the Desmond-Mailer Bill. See, Desmond, The
Newsman's Privilege Bill, 13 Albany L. Rev. 1 (1949). Prior attempts
to enact journalist privilege bills in New York were made in 1930, 1935,
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1946 and 1947.
31 See Hearings before the House Committee on World War Veterans
Legislation, Part I, 165-83, 856-662, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (1945).
32 Another journalist was questioned by the Committee on World War
Veterans Legislation about the same time Deutsch appeared. The second
journalist was Albert Q. Maisel, whose article, "Third-rate Medicine for
First-rate Men," appeared in Cosmopolitan Magazine, March 1945, p. 35.
33 Hearings, supra note 31, at 165.
34 Id. at 172.
35 Id. at 342. For newspaper protests leveled at the committee's decision to cite Deutsch for contempt, see 91 Cong. Rec. A2554 (1945). The
more lenient attitude reflected by the committee in the Deutsch case also
is reflected in another incident which arose during World War II. In
January 1943, the Akron (Ohio) Beacon-Journal published claims that
union seamen had refused to unload badly needed cargo at Guadalcanal
on Sunday. The sources for the stories were returned veterans who had
been interviewed by newspaper personnel. A subcommittee of the House
Committee on Naval Affairs held hearings at which Charles C. Miller, city
editor, and :Mrs. Helen Waterhouse, a reporter, were questioned. House
Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on Sundry Legislation, No. 29, 12196, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). The subcommittee did not press for
the names of the veterans who were the sources, and reported: "It would
have been helpful had the paper seen fit to submit to us the names, which
we assured the publisher would be kept in confidence so as to minimize
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informants in order to make an accurate determination of what
legislation was needed, then Deutsch should have been compelled
to disclose his sources. If, on the other hand, the committee could
obtain the needed information without forcing Deutsch to disclose his confidential sources, then it would seem a privilege
could be allowed without detriment to the public.
These cases indicate that there are instances in which the
employment of confidential sources by journalists results in a
very real benefit to the public. Patently absent from the ~aterials
set out above are the many instances in which the journalist has
published his information and has never been questioned about
his source. With the point established that there are instances
in which the public enjoys a benefit from the relationship, it
would appear that there are times when a journalist-informant
privilege could be allowed. The question then arises : How broad
should such a privilege be'?
WHEN SHOULD THE PRIVILEGE BE DENIED'?
There are two conditions which should limit the application
of the privilege. Both of these conditions are related to the element of public benefit. First, where there is an absence of public
benefit in the disclosure of the information, there is no foundation upon which to build the claim for the privilege. Secondly
where the public detriment which would be experienced by allowing the privilege is greater than the benefit gained from the protection of the relationship, then the privilege should not be allowed.
WHEN IS THERE NO PUBLIC BENEFIT?
There are two situations in which it is clear that no public
benefit arises from the revelation of information through the
employment of a confidential journalist-informant relationship.
the possibility of military recrimination. We are aware, however, of the
customary practice of newspapers in not revealing the sources of such
stories." Hearings, supra, No. 30 at 199. Rep. Magnuson of Washington
said the newspaper charges were unfounded and praised the Merchant
Marine. 89 Cong. Rec. A952 (1943).
In a state case in 1934, however, Vance L. Armentrout was held in
contempt of the Kentucky House of Representatives when he refused to
identify who had written a letter-to-the-editor signed "A Member of the
House of Representatives." The letter was highly critical of the conduct
of the President of the House in reference to rulings from the chair.
Armentrout, acting editor of the Louisville Courier, was jailed by the investigating committee, released on bail, and the House as a body substituted a $25 fine for incarceration. See Editor & Publisher 4 (March
24, 1934).
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The first of these occurs where the revelation of the information
itself violates public policy. Such situations occur when state
secrets are revealed or the secret proceedings of grand juries are
published. Journalist. contempt cases have arisen upon both of
these particular fact backgrounds, and the testimonial privilege
was properly denied in every instance.36 Clearly, where a privilege is based upon a theory that the newsman is benefiting the
public by furnishing information which it ought to have, then the
foundation for the privilege is destroyed when public policy demands that the substance of the information should not be disclosed.37
The second instance in which no public benefit accrues from
the publication of the information arises when the information is
in fact false. 38 Obviously, no public benefit results from the dissemination of erroneous information. This element has bothered
some groups which have commented on the privilege question,39
and probably explains some of the mechanical restrictions of the
existing privilege statutes.40 Of course, it is a mechanical impossibility to use the truth of the newsman's published information as an element in determining whether a privilege should be
36 In the l\Iatter of Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dst. Ct. 475 (1914); Ex parte
Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas. 471, No. 10375 (C.C.D.C. 1848); Clein v. State, 52
So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Lester M. Hunt (unreported) N.Y. Times, May
20, 1939, p. 10, col. 4; l\Iay 23, 1939, p. 25, col. 7; John T. Morris (unreported) Editor & Publisher 9 (Sept. 1, 1934); Hiram J. Ramsdell and
Zebb L. White, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 846-88, 929 (1871).
The Ramsdell and White case and the Nugent case involved the revelation
of treaties which were under consideration by the Senate in executive
session. The remainder deal with disclosure of grand jury proceedings
and refusals by the newsmen to reveal who had given them their information about the secret proceedings.
37 For discussions of the policy reasons underlying secrecy in grand jury
proceedings see Schmidt v. United States. 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940);
United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940);
United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md.
1931).
3S In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 Atl. 1011 (1913).
Reporter Julius
Grunow of the Jersey Journal wrote a news story stating that a trustee
for the Village of Ridgefield Park had claimed the village surveyor had
presented claims for grading which had previously been paid. The trustee's claim was allegedly made at a regular village board of trustees meeting, which Grunow did not attend personally. Grunow, called before a
grand jury investigating the possibility of criminal libel in the publication, refused to reveal who was his source, and was fined $25. His fine
was held valid by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
39 See Memorandum No. 40, Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. New York Law Revision Commission. Legis. Doc. 65(A) 81 (1949).
40 See note 10 supra.
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allowed in a particular case. The accuracy of his news item is
not determined until after the decision on the privilege question
is rendered. However, it is essential to know whether the disclosure of the newsman's confidential sources is necessary to determine the truth of his published statements. This question can
be resolved at the th'lle the privilege question is raised. If thB
information is in fact false, then the privilege would undoubtedly
be denied on conditions to be discussed below.
WHEN DOES DETRIMENT OUTWEIGH BENEFIT?
The prime argument leveled against any testimonial privilege
is that it hampers the due administration of justice. The public
is injured when litigation is stymied and the enforcement of the
law is impeded. It should be noted that hamper is a word of degree, which could include anything from a mere inconvenience to
an absolute bar to a particular proceeding. The degree to which
the journalist's refusal to disclose his source hampers an investigation or legal proceeding should be a material consideration. If
the refusal to disclose the sources causes nothing more than an
inconvenience, the argument that the due administration of justice
is impaired is not too overpowering. But, where the refusal effectively stifles the particular proceeding, the same argument
would override any claim of public benefit which may support
the privilege claim. Disclosure of information by a journalist is
not an end in itself. If the newsman has disclosed a situation requiring investigation, and then stops the investigative process by
his recalcitrance, he has destroyed the public benefit arising from
his disclosure through the use of a confidential source. Where
the proceeding is thus impaired, the privilege should not be allowed to operate and whatever force is necessary should be employed to bring about the disclosure of the source of information.
While this element of degree is not specifically discussed in
the cases, it can be seen that the degree to which the non-disclosure has deterred the legal proceeding has varied considerably.
In the Simonton case, supra, the non-disclosure of the source did
not prove too great a barrier to the investigation of the specific
charges Simonton had raised in his published news item. The
same conclusion can be drawn from the Shriver case, supra. However, there are cases in which it can be seen that the journalist's
refusal to disclose his source has effectively barred the accurate
conclusion of the particular proceeding.
In the case of Nat Caldwell, a reporter for the Kno};.'Ville
Tennessean, a grand jury was instructed to investigate possible
liquor law violations after Caldwell had published a story charg-
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ing such acts.41 Caldwell's story intimated that a state highway
patrolman had an interest in a local liquor store and was providing safe conduct for bootlegged liquor out of the county and into
surrounding "dry" counties. Caldwell refused to disclose where
he had obtained his information and the grand jury failed to return an indictment. The County Court of Anderson County refused to cite Caldwell for contempt, on the grounds that a privilege should be recognized. 42 It is an open question as to whether
the grand jury would have found sufficient grounds for an indictment had it been availed of Caldwell's sources. In this situation, it appears that the grand jury certainly should have had the
benefit of whatever information Caldwell possessed, and a privilege should not have been allowed.
Another example of the journalist's non-disclosure apparently
materially hampering an investigation is the case of A.M.
Lawrence and L.L. Levings.43 These two San Francisco newsmen
alleged in news items that bribes were being given to the state
legislators and they were called to testify before a committee of
the California Senate. They refused to divulge their sources of
information and were jailed for contempt. The California Supreme Court held their commitment valid in habeas corpus proceedings, saying:
If the witnesses, first answering that they had no personal
knowledge of the matter, were to be justified in refusing to give
the names of th~ir informant, the senatorial inquiry must neces-i
sarily come to an end. Upon the other hand, if they stated the
names of their informants, and the nature of their information,
the senate could summon those persons and so trace the charges
to a conclusion. The evidence then was relevant and pertinent.44

The senatorial investigation was not stymied by the refusal of
the newsmen to testify, and it proceeded to a conclusion that the
41 Nat Caldwell (unreported) N.Y. Times, June 1, 1948, p. 25, col. 7;
Editor & Publisher 59 (May 29, 1948); Editor & Publisher 64 (June 5,
1948).
12 The opinion of the county court is set out in New York Law Revision
Commission, Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 65 (1949):
The press must get its information thru others, of necessity
much is given in confidence, and I am unable to hold the witness
in contempt of this matter. It's true it is hard to have serious
charges made against public officials on hearsay evidence, but at
times much good has been done in that way. It puts us all on
guard, and to ask ourselves: "Lord is it I"? Lincoln said: "If
the end brings me out alright, what is said against me won't
amount to anything."
43 Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897).
44 Id. at 299, 48 Pac. at 125.
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charges were false. 45 Lawrence later produced documents which
tended to support the charges which had been made originally.4 "
It would seem that in such a situation, where apparently all other
sources of information tend to disprove the journalist's claim, a
proper conclusion cannot be reached without resort to the journalist's sources and he should be compelled to reveal them.
An instance in which a privilege apparently was recognized
and the proceeding not impaired is evidenced by the case of Frank
L. Toughill.47 Toughill, a reporter for the Philadelphia Recorcl,
wrote a story disclosing that the State Alcohol Permit Board had
issued a license in a secret session and later rescinded their action.
Toughill was called upon to disclose his source in county court
proceedings brought to secure issuance of the license. The reporter refused to disclose his source, e::i...-plaining that to do so might
result in his dismissal as a news reporter, and the court did not
force him to testify on the matter.48 Here, where an accurate
source of information was the Permit Board itself, the privilege
was properly recognized. (The court, incidentally, got the needed
information, and ordered the issuance of the license.) 49
CONCLUSION
Adequate grounds exist for the recognition of a journalistinformant privilege under certain conditions. Instances have been
pointed out where the use of confidential sources has resulted in
concrete benefits though the identity of the source has been denied
to the court or committee seeking to discover it. There are undoubtedly countless other instances in which the public has benefited, in varying degrees, from the dissemination of information
thus gained where the journalist was never called upon to disclose where he got his news.
45 Letter from l\Irs. Carma R. Zimmerman, California State Librarian,
to Nebraska Law Review.
46 Ibid.
The letter states inter alia: ·•However, a later account of the
life of Andrew l\I. Lawrence written by Mr. O'Day for the San Francisco
Recorder and published on March 21 and 22, 1946, seems to indicate that
Lawrence was successful in bringing telegrams out in public that tainted
the names of forty-four members of the Legislature. Where O'Day got
his facts for his article, we have been unable to determine. There have
been no subsequent official reports on the matter. . . ".
47 Frank L. Toughill (unreported) Editor &
Publisher 16 (Dec. 9,
1933). Pennsylvania adopted a confidence statute in 1937, see note 10
supra.
48 Ibid.
49 After Toughill was excused from testifying, an attorney for the plaintiff-applicant divulged that a deputy attorney general had been the source
of information.
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In the main, the use of contempt proceedings has not proved
a grand success at bringing forth disclosure of the source. Where
the privilege has been denied, its place has been filled with the
journalist's obstinacy. 50 In the public's eye, the Fourth Estate
seems as capable at vindicating its silent brethren as are the
courts and legislative bodies at preserving their dignity through
contempt proceedings. The existence or non-existence of the privilege would seem to have little effect then on the due administration of justice. The actual result has been that the administration of certain proceedings has been inconvenienced or hampered
in varying degrees, newsmen have been jailed for short periods,
and the press emotionally has claimed another martyr. While
theoretically this course may in part follow "the trend of best
legal judgment" 51 in disallowing further occupational privileges,
it fails to win measurable benefits for the public.
A more rational course to pursue would be one which does
not settle the matter solely on the question of the witness' occupational pursuit. Looking to broader grounds of public benefit and
detriment which would flow from allowance or denial of a privilege is preferable. 52 Such flexibility has been injected in other
personal testimonial privileges. The widely recognized privilege
of law enforcement officers not to reveal their confidentail informants is limited and can be denied if the trial judge feels such
revelation is necessary to protect the rights of the defendant. 53
And, in North Carolina, the physician-patient privilege is similarly

50 Of the cases discussed in this note, only two have resulted in the
newsman's identification after his citation for contempt, These are: In
the :Matter of Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914); Eddie Barr (unreported) N.Y. Times, March 13, 1931. p. 25, col. 8.
ul II Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 4 9 6 ( 19 4 7).
l:i2 The New York Law Revision Commission recommended such a middle
course after its extensive study. The recommended statute, which has not
been enacted, provided that "The body, officer, person or party seeking
the information may apply to the supreme court for an order divesting
the reporter of the privilege. . . . The order shall be granted only when
the court, after hearing the parties, shall find that disclosure is essential
to the protection of the public interest." New York Law Revision Commission Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 6-7 (1949). The qualified privilege narrowly
won the favor of the New York State Society of Newspaper Editors by
an 18 to 13 vote. Editor & Publisher 9 (Feb. 5, 1949). The New York
Herald Tribune complained editorial!y that the proposed bill was "a
bumbling effort which allows the courts to say what is news . . . " Editor
& Publisher 50 (Feb. 19, 1949).
ro Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). See Annot., 83 L. Ed.
155 (1939).
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conditioned,64 a limitation that has won favorable comment as
putting needed flexibility into the rule. 55 Thus it should be with
a journalist's claim of privilege. This general approach has been
urged by Zachariah Chafee Jr., in his report on "Government and
Mass Communications." Chafee urged:
. . . [J]udges should retain their present power to -0rder a
reporter to testify or else go to jail for contempt.
On the other hand, this power to make reporters disclose their
confidential sources of information should be exercised with great
caution. The power also applies to priests, as just stated, but few
lawyers or judges would press a question to a priest after he had
invoked his professional duty of silence. It is similarly desirable to respect the reporter's claim of confidence except in cases
of great necessity where he clearly possesses knowledge which is
otherwise unobtainable.56

Unfortunately, the restraint urged by Chafee finds little support
from either the reported opinions or from the journalist privilege
statutes. These sources would point to one of the two extremes,
complete denial or blanket acceptance of a privilege, leaving no
room for compromise.
The sympathetic attitudes frequently reflected by judges and
law officers towards those newsmen who have been held in contempt perhaps reflects a latent recognition of merit in the journalist's position. 57 A review of the cases in this field could lead one
to conclude that the contempt power is being exercised only as a
matter of ritual much as a reluctant father adminsters a spanking
in a this-will-hurt-me-as-much-as-you frame of mind. With policy
lines clearly drawn in a qualified privilege so that the journalist
and the responsible authority know where the public good does
or does not demand disclosure of the journalist's source, it would
seem the proper authority would be more free to use whatever
IH The North Carolina privilege is concluded with the following provision: "Provided, that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper
administration of justice." N.C. Gen. Stats. § 8-53 (Michie, 1953).
55 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2381.
56 II Chafee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 496-97.
57 E.g., Jack Durham and Wesley Carty (unreported) Editor & Publisher 3 (Aug. 4, 1934). These two reporters were subjected daily to
incarceration or fines for refusing to disclose who had given them an
advance tip on the hanging in effigy of a member of the Kentucky House
of Representatives. But, the pair were allowed to work their normal
hours and spend off-duty hours in jail. They were released when a college student volunteered evidence.
In the Leonard and Clark case, see notes 27-29 supra, the newsmen
were allowed to received calls and presents (including a cake with files
protruding through the icing) and to write news stories from their cells.
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force would be necessary to obtain the needed information. With
reported authorities on the point as clearly and broadly stated
as they are, recognition of a qualified privilege probably could
not come about without legislation. Such a limited privilege
could be spelled out in the following manner:
Subject to the following two exceptions, no person engaged
in the work of gathering, writing, publishing or disseminating
news for any newspaper, periodical. press association, or radio or
television station, shall be held in contempt by any authority for
refusing to divulge the source of information which such person
has accepted in confidence and caused to be published or disseminated. Exception 1. This privilege shall not apply where
the information gained by such person concerned the details of
any proceeding which was required to be secret under the laws of
this state or of the federal government. Exception 2. This privilege shall not apply where it shall be shown conclusively to the
judge of the district court, in which district the proceeding is
taking place, that (a) all plausible sources of information have
been exhausted, and (b) the proceeding or inquiry cannot be
concluded without taking testimony from the source or sources
sought to be kept secret under this statute.

W. D. Lorensen, '57

